Having read many books on Osama Bin Laden since 9/11 I would say this is probably the most concise quasi-biography of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. I say quasi because the point of the book is not to tell the entire life history of Bin Laden but to make a very clear point and debunk myths.
The point? Bin Laden is alive and well. He still has great influence and ability to lead the al-Qaeda terrorist network. He is not an unintelligent figurehead swayed by others. And he remains one of the biggest threats to US national security. The author debunks that he is sick or dead, that al-Qaeda is a fractured and declawed organization, and that it does not pose as great a threat as it once did, as some journalists and even government officials will claim.
He also clearly lays out that the prime reason for Bin Laden's call to arms is US policy toward Israel and the Middle East, and his anti-Saudi stance because they have allowed infidel troops into the holy land.
While close readers of the literature of Bin Laden will not find a lot new here, what you will find is a well laid out, concise debunking of the myths perpetuated by the media and review of Bin Laden's life and reasons for his stance against the West and other Arab leaders.
Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts
Friday, March 18, 2011
Thursday, July 1, 2010
One of the Better Post-9/11 Histories
Coll provides a highly detailed, well written account of the history of the CIA and United States in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to 9/11. I highly recommend this work for anyone who is interested in how we came to the point we are in Afghanistan post-9/11, and how we inadvertently provided Bin Laden fertile ground for a successful terrorist operation.
Frankly, after reading this account, I became empathetic toward the CIA, Clinton and those in his administration, and the Pakistani and Saudi governments. Clearly their positions and actions lead to the rise of the Taliban. While lots of mistakes and maybe some shortsightedness existed among these players, they were all dealing with intricate and sensitive internal political issues that drove their decisions, or in the case of the United States, lack of action, in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
While Bin Laden would likely have existed without the safe haven he found in Afghanistan, his ability to train and draw followers so freely and with impunity is partially "blowback" from actions taken by the CIA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan war as money and weapons poured into the country.
There is also quite a bit of information about Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It's interesting to speculate how more assistance to Massoud might have thwarted or overthrown the Taliban and as a result push Bin Laden into less favorable circumstances. But given Massoud's failure as a political leader in his first opportunity, the brutality of his troops, and being an ethnic minority in his country, again one can empathize with why the United States was reluctant to pin their hopes on him.
If you are trying to decide which of the very large number of books about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden are worth reading, this is one of them.
Frankly, after reading this account, I became empathetic toward the CIA, Clinton and those in his administration, and the Pakistani and Saudi governments. Clearly their positions and actions lead to the rise of the Taliban. While lots of mistakes and maybe some shortsightedness existed among these players, they were all dealing with intricate and sensitive internal political issues that drove their decisions, or in the case of the United States, lack of action, in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
While Bin Laden would likely have existed without the safe haven he found in Afghanistan, his ability to train and draw followers so freely and with impunity is partially "blowback" from actions taken by the CIA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan war as money and weapons poured into the country.
There is also quite a bit of information about Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It's interesting to speculate how more assistance to Massoud might have thwarted or overthrown the Taliban and as a result push Bin Laden into less favorable circumstances. But given Massoud's failure as a political leader in his first opportunity, the brutality of his troops, and being an ethnic minority in his country, again one can empathize with why the United States was reluctant to pin their hopes on him.
If you are trying to decide which of the very large number of books about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden are worth reading, this is one of them.
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