I have somewhat mixed reactions to this portrait of Ahmad Shah Massoud. On reflection I found it a worthwhile and rewarding read, particularly as it dispels myths perpetrated by others (such as Massoud being as vicious as his enemies) and makes it rather clear that the Pakistani ISI is greatly responsible for the rise and arming of the Taliban to control and subjugate Afghanistan (even though this is tangential to the book).
But this is really a collection of stories, blurbs, and remembrances of Massoud that tell what he was like as a man and leader through the eyes of others. It paints Massoud as an intuitively excellent military strategist and a deeply humble and spiritual leader. It clearly puts Massoud on a very high pedestal as a Sufi like Islamic leader, not only humble but with an ability to deeply affect others on a spiritual level. He was also forward thinking as a believer in rights for women (such as having an education and career), tolerant of the religion of others, and kind (or at least not brutal) to his enemies. He contradictorily abhorred violence yet had to embrace it given the circumstances.
His failures in an impossible situation once the Soviets were thrown out of Afghanistan as Defense Minister under a shaky regime are probably the best sections of the book, as they allow us to see Massoud from a different, less critical angle, that is no doubt as true, if not more so, than those of his critics.
The author makes it very clear that this is not a critical biography of Massoud but look at this life through eyes of his close family, friends, and others that knew him very well. She does the reader a service by this (even though the disclaimer is in obscure place).
While I found the structure of the book, mostly very short vignettes from those close to Massoud, off putting at times, it was mostly well organized. It is structured in a logical and mostly chronological order, although sometimes the book is structured around themes especially toward the end.
If you want to know more about Massoud, at least from those who admired him most, this book is a good introduction. But as the author says herself, if you are look for a well rounded biography of Massoud that places him more clearly the entire context of Afghan history and culture, this is not the book for you.
Showing posts with label Afghanastan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanastan. Show all posts
Friday, March 11, 2011
Thursday, July 1, 2010
One of the Better Post-9/11 Histories
Coll provides a highly detailed, well written account of the history of the CIA and United States in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to 9/11. I highly recommend this work for anyone who is interested in how we came to the point we are in Afghanistan post-9/11, and how we inadvertently provided Bin Laden fertile ground for a successful terrorist operation.
Frankly, after reading this account, I became empathetic toward the CIA, Clinton and those in his administration, and the Pakistani and Saudi governments. Clearly their positions and actions lead to the rise of the Taliban. While lots of mistakes and maybe some shortsightedness existed among these players, they were all dealing with intricate and sensitive internal political issues that drove their decisions, or in the case of the United States, lack of action, in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
While Bin Laden would likely have existed without the safe haven he found in Afghanistan, his ability to train and draw followers so freely and with impunity is partially "blowback" from actions taken by the CIA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan war as money and weapons poured into the country.
There is also quite a bit of information about Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It's interesting to speculate how more assistance to Massoud might have thwarted or overthrown the Taliban and as a result push Bin Laden into less favorable circumstances. But given Massoud's failure as a political leader in his first opportunity, the brutality of his troops, and being an ethnic minority in his country, again one can empathize with why the United States was reluctant to pin their hopes on him.
If you are trying to decide which of the very large number of books about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden are worth reading, this is one of them.
Frankly, after reading this account, I became empathetic toward the CIA, Clinton and those in his administration, and the Pakistani and Saudi governments. Clearly their positions and actions lead to the rise of the Taliban. While lots of mistakes and maybe some shortsightedness existed among these players, they were all dealing with intricate and sensitive internal political issues that drove their decisions, or in the case of the United States, lack of action, in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
While Bin Laden would likely have existed without the safe haven he found in Afghanistan, his ability to train and draw followers so freely and with impunity is partially "blowback" from actions taken by the CIA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan war as money and weapons poured into the country.
There is also quite a bit of information about Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It's interesting to speculate how more assistance to Massoud might have thwarted or overthrown the Taliban and as a result push Bin Laden into less favorable circumstances. But given Massoud's failure as a political leader in his first opportunity, the brutality of his troops, and being an ethnic minority in his country, again one can empathize with why the United States was reluctant to pin their hopes on him.
If you are trying to decide which of the very large number of books about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden are worth reading, this is one of them.
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